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# RFC 9861

## KangarooTwelve and TurboSHAKE

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### Abstract

This document defines four eXtensible-Output Functions (XOFs), hash functions with output of arbitrary length, named TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256.

All four functions provide efficient and secure hashing primitives, and the last two are able to exploit the parallelism of the implementation in a scalable way.

This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group. It builds up on the definitions of the permutations and of the sponge construction in NIST FIPS 202 and is meant to serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide.

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## 1. Introduction

This document defines the TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256 [TURBOSHAKE], KT128, and KT256 [KT] eXtendable-Output Functions (XOFs), i.e., hash function generalizations that can return an output of arbitrary length. Both TurboSHAKE128 and TurboSHAKE256 are based on a Keccak-p permutation specified in [FIPS202] and have a higher speed than the SHA-3 and SHAKE functions.

TurboSHAKE is a sponge function family that makes use of Keccak-p[n\_r=12,b=1600], a round-reduced version of the permutation used in SHA-3. Similarly to the SHAKE's security, it proposes two security strengths: 128 bits for TurboSHAKE128 and 256 bits for TurboSHAKE256. Halving the number of rounds compared to the original SHAKE functions makes TurboSHAKE roughly two times faster.

KangarooTwelve applies tree hashing on top of TurboSHAKE and comprises two functions, KT128 and KT256. Note that [KT] only defined KT128 under the name KangarooTwelve. KT256 is defined in this document.

The SHA-3 and SHAKE functions process data in a serial manner and are strongly limited in exploiting available parallelism in modern CPU architectures. Similar to ParallelHash [SP800-185], KangarooTwelve splits the input message into fragments. It then applies TurboSHAKE on each of them separately before applying TurboSHAKE again on the combination of the first fragment and the digests. More precisely, KT128 uses TurboSHAKE128 and KT256 uses TurboSHAKE256. They make use of Sakura coding for ensuring soundness of the tree hashing mode [SAKURA]. The use of TurboSHAKE in KangarooTwelve makes it faster than ParallelHash.

The security of TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 builds on the public scrutiny that Keccak has received since its publication [KECCAK\_CRYPTANALYSIS] [TURBOSHAKE].

With respect to functions defined in [FIPS202] and [SP800-185], TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 feature the following advantages:

- Unlike SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, the TurboSHAKE and KangarooTwelve functions have an extendable output.
- Unlike any functions in [FIPS202], and similar to functions in [SP800-185], KT128 and KT256 allow the use of a customization string.
- Unlike any functions in [FIPS202] and [SP800-185] except for ParallelHash, KT128 and KT256 exploit available parallelism.
- Unlike ParallelHash, KT128 and KT256 do not have overhead when processing short messages.

- The permutation in the TurboSHAKE functions has half the number of rounds compared to the one in the SHA-3 and SHAKE functions, making them faster than any function defined in [FIPS202]. The KangarooTwelve functions immediately benefit from the same speedup, improving over [FIPS202] and [SP800-185].

With respect to SHA-256, SHA-512, and other functions defined in [FIPS180], TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 feature the following advantages:

- Unlike any functions in [FIPS180], the TurboSHAKE and KangarooTwelve functions have an extendable output.
- The TurboSHAKE functions produce output at the same rate as they process input, whereas SHA-256 and SHA-512, when used in a mask generation function (MGF) construction, produce output half as fast as they process input.
- Unlike the SHA-256 and SHA-512 functions, TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 do not suffer from the length extension weakness.
- Unlike any functions in [FIPS180], TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 use a round function with algebraic degree 2, which makes them more suitable to masking techniques for protections against side-channel attacks.

This document represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. It has been reviewed by two members of the Crypto Review Panel, as well as by several members of the CFRG. It is not an IETF product and is not a standard.

## 1.1. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The following notations are used throughout the document:

- ``...`` denotes a string of bytes given in hexadecimal. For example, ``0B 80``.
- `|s|` denotes the length of a byte string `s``. For example, `|`FF FF`| = 2`.
- ``00`b` denotes a byte string consisting of the concatenation of `b` bytes ``00``. For example, ``00`7 = `00 00 00 00 00 00 00``.
- ``00`0` denotes the empty byte string.
- `a|b` denotes the concatenation of two strings, `a` and `b`. For example, ``10`|`F1` = `10 F1``.
- `s[n:m]` denotes the selection of bytes from `n` (inclusive) to `m` (exclusive) of a string `s`. The indexing of a byte string starts at 0. For example, for `s = `A5 C6 D7``, `s[0:1] = `A5`` and `s[1:3] = `C6 D7``.
- `s[n:]` denotes the selection of bytes from `n` to the end of a string `s`. For example, for `s = `A5 C6 D7``, `s[0:] = `A5 C6 D7`` and `s[2:] = `D7``.

In the following,  $x$  and  $y$  are byte strings of equal length:

- $x^{\wedge}y$  denotes  $x$  takes the value  $x$  XOR  $y$ .
- $x \& y$  denotes  $x$  AND  $y$ .

In the following,  $x$  and  $y$  are integers:

- $x+=y$  denotes  $x$  takes the value  $x + y$ .
- $x-=y$  denotes  $x$  takes the value  $x - y$ .
- $x^{**}y$  denotes the exponentiation of  $x$  by  $y$ .
- $x \bmod y$  denotes the remainder of the division of  $x$  by  $y$ .
- $x / y$  denotes the integer dividend of the division of  $x$  by  $y$ .

## 2. TurboSHAKE

### 2.1. Interface

TurboSHAKE is a family of eXtendable-Output Functions (XOFs). Internally, it makes use of the sponge construction, parameterized by two integers, the rate and the capacity, that sum to the permutation width (here, 1600 bits). The rate gives the number of bits processed or produced per call to the permutation, whereas the capacity determines the security level; see [FIPS202] for more details. This document focuses on only two instances, namely TurboSHAKE128 and TurboSHAKE256. (Note that the original definition includes a wider range of instances parameterized by their capacity [TURBOSHAKE].)

A TurboSHAKE instance takes a byte string  $M$ , an **OPTIONAL** byte  $D$ , and a positive integer  $L$  as input parameters, where:

- $M$  byte string is the message,
- $D$  byte in the range [`'01'`, `'02'`, .. , `'7F'`] is an **OPTIONAL** domain separation byte, and
- $L$  positive integer is the requested number of output bytes.

Conceptually, an XOF can be viewed as a hash function with an infinitely long output truncated to  $L$  bytes. This means that calling an XOF with the same input parameters but two different lengths yields outputs such that the shorter one is a prefix of the longer one. Specifically, if  $L_1 < L_2$ , then  $\text{TurboSHAKE}(M, D, L_1)$  is the same as the first  $L_1$  bytes of  $\text{TurboSHAKE}(M, D, L_2)$ .

By default, the domain separation byte is `'1F'`. For an API that does not support a domain separation byte,  $D$  **MUST** be the `'1F'`.

The TurboSHAKE instance produces output that is a hash of the  $(M, D)$  couple. If  $D$  is fixed, this becomes a hash of the message  $M$ . However, a protocol that requires a number of independent hash functions can choose different values for  $D$  to implement these. Specifically, for distinct values  $D_1$  and  $D_2$ ,  $\text{TurboSHAKE}(M, D_1, L_1)$  and  $\text{TurboSHAKE}(M, D_2, L_2)$  yield independent hashes of  $M$ .

Note that an implementation **MAY** propose an incremental input interface where the input string  $M$  is given in pieces. If so, the output **MUST** be the same as if the function was called with  $M$  equal to the concatenation of the different pieces in the order they were given. Independently, an implementation **MAY** propose an incremental output interface where the output string is requested in pieces of given lengths. When the output is formed by concatenating the pieces in the requested order, it **MUST** be the same as if the function was called with  $L$  equal to the sum of the given lengths.

## 2.2. Specifications

TurboSHAKE makes use of the permutation Keccak-p[1600,n\_r=12], i.e., the permutation used in SHAKE and SHA-3 functions reduced to its last  $n_r=12$  rounds as specified in FIPS 202; see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of [FIPS202].  $KP$  denotes this permutation.

Similarly to SHAKE128, TurboSHAKE128 is a sponge function calling this permutation  $KP$  with a rate of 168 bytes or 1344 bits. It follows that TurboSHAKE128 has a capacity of  $1600 - 1344 = 256$  bits or 32 bytes. Respectively to SHAKE256, TurboSHAKE256 makes use of a rate of 136 bytes or 1088 bits and has a capacity of 512 bits or 64 bytes.

	Rate	Capacity
<b>TurboSHAKE128</b>	168 Bytes	32 Bytes
<b>TurboSHAKE256</b>	136 Bytes	64 Bytes

Table 1

We now describe the operations inside TurboSHAKE128.

- First, the input  $M'$  is formed by appending the domain separation byte  $D$  to the message  $M$ .
- If the length of  $M'$  is not a multiple of 168 bytes, then it is padded with zeros at the end to make it a multiple of 168 bytes. If  $M'$  is already a multiple of 168 bytes, then no padding is added. Then, a byte `'80'` is XORed to the last byte of the padded input  $M'$  and the resulting string is split into a sequence of 168-byte blocks.
- $M'$  never has a length of 0 bytes due to the presence of the domain separation byte.
- As defined by the sponge construction, the process operates on a state and consists of two phases: the absorbing phase, which processes the padded input  $M'$ , and the squeezing phase, which produces the output.
- In the absorbing phase, the state is initialized to all zero. The message blocks are XORed into the first 168 bytes of the state. Each block absorbed is followed with an application of  $KP$  to the state.
- In the squeezing phase, the output is formed by taking the first 168 bytes of the state, applying  $KP$  to the state, and repeating as many times as is necessary.

TurboSHAKE256 performs the same steps but makes use of 136-byte blocks with respect to the padding, absorbing, and squeezing phases.

The definition of the TurboSHAKE functions equivalently implements the pad10\*1 rule; see Section 5.1 of [FIPS202] for a definition of pad10\*1. While M can be empty, the D byte is always present and is in the `01`-`7F` range. This last byte serves as domain separation and integrates the first bit of padding of the pad10\*1 rule (hence, it cannot be `00`). Additionally, it must leave room for the second bit of padding (hence, it cannot have the most significant bit (MSB) set to 1), should it be the last byte of the block. For more details, refer to Section 6.1 of [KT] and Section 3 of [TURBOSHAKE].

The pseudocode versions of TurboSHAKE128 and TurboSHAKE256 are provided in Appendices A.2 and A.3, respectively.

## 3. KangarooTwelve: Tree Hashing over TurboSHAKE

### 3.1. Interface

KangarooTwelve is a family of eXtendable-Output Functions (XOFs) consisting of the KT128 and KT256 instances. A KangarooTwelve instance takes two byte strings (M, C) and a positive integer L as input parameters, where:

- M byte string is the message,
- C byte string is an **OPTIONAL** customization string, and
- L positive integer is the requested number of output bytes.

The customization string **MAY** serve as domain separation. It is typically a short string such as a name or an identifier (e.g., URI, Object Identifier (OID), etc.). It can serve the same purpose as TurboSHAKE's D input parameter (see Section 2.1) but with a larger range.

By default, the customization string is the empty string. For an API that does not support a customization string parameter, C **MUST** be the empty string.

Note that an implementation **MAY** propose an interface with the input and/or output provided incrementally, as specified in Section 2.1.

### 3.2. Specification of KT128

On top of the sponge function TurboSHAKE128, KT128 uses a Sakura-compatible tree hash mode [SAKURA]. First, merge M and the **OPTIONAL** C to a single input string S in a reversible way. `length_encode( |C| )` gives the length in bytes of C as a byte string. See Section 3.3.

```
S = M || C || length_encode( |C| )
```

Then, split S into n chunks of 8192 bytes.

```

S = S_0 || .. || S_(n-1)
|S_0| = .. = |S_(n-2)| = 8192 bytes
|S_(n-1)| <= 8192 bytes

```

From  $S_1 .. S_{(n-1)}$ , compute the 32-byte chaining values  $CV_1 .. CV_{(n-1)}$ . In order to be optimally efficient, this computation **MAY** exploit the parallelism available on the platform, such as single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) instructions.

```

CV_i = TurboSHAKE128( S_i, `0B`, 32 )

```

Compute the final node: FinalNode.

- If  $|S| \leq 8192$  bytes, FinalNode = S.
- Otherwise, compute FinalNode as follows:

```

FinalNode = S_0 || `03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`
FinalNode = FinalNode || CV_1
..
FinalNode = FinalNode || CV_(n-1)
FinalNode = FinalNode || length_encode(n-1)
FinalNode = FinalNode || `FF FF`

```

Finally, the KT128 output is retrieved:

- If  $|S| \leq 8192$  bytes, from TurboSHAKE128( FinalNode, `07`, L )

```

KT128( M, C, L ) = TurboSHAKE128( FinalNode, `07`, L )

```

- Otherwise, from TurboSHAKE128( FinalNode, `06`, L )

```

KT128( M, C, L ) = TurboSHAKE128( FinalNode, `06`, L )

```

The following figure illustrates the computation flow of KT128 for  $|S| \leq 8192$  bytes:


```

+-----+ TurboSHAKE128(..., `07`, L)
|      S      |-----> output
+-----+

```

The following figure illustrates the computation flow of KT128 for  $|S| > 8192$  bytes and where TurboSHAKE128 and length\_encode( x ) are abbreviated as TSHK128 and l\_e( x ), respectively:





A pseudocode version is provided in [Appendix A.4](#).

The table below gathers the values of the domain separation bytes used by the tree hash mode:

Type	Byte
SingleNode	'07'
IntermediateNode	'0B'
FinalNode	'06'

Table 2

### 3.3. length\_encode( x )

The function length\_encode takes as inputs a non-negative integer  $x < 256^{**}255$  and outputs a string of bytes  $x_{(n-1)} || .. || x_0 || n$  where

$$x = \text{sum of } 256^{**i} * x_i \text{ for } i \text{ from } 0 \text{ to } n-1$$

and where  $n$  is the smallest non-negative integer such that  $x < 256^{**}n$ .  $n$  is also the length of  $x_{(n-1)} || .. || x_0$ .

For example, `length_encode(0) = `00``, `length_encode(12) = `0C 01``, and `length_encode(65538) = `01 00 02 03``.

A pseudocode version is as follows, where  $\{ b \}$  denotes the byte of numerical value  $b$ .

```
length_encode(x):
  S = `00`^0

  while x > 0
    S = { x mod 256 } || S
    x = x / 256

  S = S || { |S| }

  return S
end
```

### 3.4. Specification of KT256

KT256 is specified exactly like KT128, with two differences:

- All the calls to TurboSHAKE128 in KT128 are replaced with calls to TurboSHAKE256 in KT256.
- The chaining values  $CV_1$  to  $CV_{(n-1)}$  are 64 bytes long in KT256 and are computed as follows:

```
CV_i = TurboSHAKE256( S_i, `0B`, 64 )
```

A pseudocode version is provided in [Appendix A.5](#).

## 4. Message Authentication Codes

Implementing a Message Authentication Code (MAC) with KT128 or KT256 **MAY** use a hash-then-MAC construction. This document defines and recommends a method called HopMAC:

```
HopMAC128(Key, M, C, L) = KT128(Key, KT128(M, C, 32), L)
HopMAC256(Key, M, C, L) = KT256(Key, KT256(M, C, 64), L)
```

Similarly to Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), HopMAC consists of two calls: an inner call compressing the message  $M$  and the optional customization string  $C$  to a digest and an outer call computing the tag from the key and the digest.

Unlike HMAC, the inner call to KangarooTwelve in HopMAC is keyless and does not require additional protection against side channel attacks (SCAs). Consequently, in an implementation that has to protect the HopMAC key against an SCA, only the outer call needs protection, and this amounts to a single execution of the underlying permutation (assuming the key length is at most 69 bytes).

In any case, TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 **MAY** be used to compute a MAC with the key reversibly prepended or appended to the input. For instance, one **MAY** compute a MAC on short messages simply calling KT128 with the key as the customization string, i.e.,  $MAC = KT128(M, Key, L)$ .

## 5. Test Vectors

Test vectors are based on the repetition of the pattern `00 01 02 .. F9 FA` with a specific length.  $ptn(n)$  defines a string by repeating the pattern `00 01 02 .. F9 FA` as many times as necessary and truncated to  $n$  bytes, for example:

```
Pattern for a length of 17 bytes:
ptn(17) =
`00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10`
```

```
Pattern for a length of 17**2 bytes:
ptn(17**2) =
`00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 5F
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 7A 7B 7C 7D 7E 7F
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8A 8B 8C 8D 8E 8F
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9A 9B 9C 9D 9E 9F
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 AA AB AC AD AE AF
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 BA BB BC BD BE BF
C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 DA DB DC DD DE DF
E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA EB EC ED EE EF
F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 FA
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F
20 21 22 23 24 25`
```

```
TurboSHAKE128(M=`00`^0, D=`1F`, 32):
`1E 41 5F 1C 59 83 AF F2 16 92 17 27 7D 17 BB 53
 8C D9 45 A3 97 DD EC 54 1F 1C E4 1A F2 C1 B7 4C`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`00`^0, D=`1F`, 64):
`1E 41 5F 1C 59 83 AF F2 16 92 17 27 7D 17 BB 53
 8C D9 45 A3 97 DD EC 54 1F 1C E4 1A F2 C1 B7 4C
 3E 8C CA E2 A4 DA E5 6C 84 A0 4C 23 85 C0 3C 15
 E8 19 3B DF 58 73 73 63 32 16 91 C0 54 62 C8 DF`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`00`^0, D=`1F`, 10032), last 32 bytes:
`A3 B9 B0 38 59 00 CE 76 1F 22 AE D5 48 E7 54 DA
 10 A5 24 2D 62 E8 C6 58 E3 F3 A9 23 A7 55 56 07`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**0 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`55 CE DD 6F 60 AF 7B B2 9A 40 42 AE 83 2E F3 F5
 8D B7 29 9F 89 3E BB 92 47 24 7D 85 69 58 DA A9`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**1 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`9C 97 D0 36 A3 BA C8 19 DB 70 ED E0 CA 55 4E C6
 E4 C2 A1 A4 FF BF D9 EC 26 9C A6 A1 11 16 12 33`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**2 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`96 C7 7C 27 9E 01 26 F7 FC 07 C9 B0 7F 5C DA E1
 E0 BE 60 BD BE 10 62 00 40 E7 5D 72 23 A6 24 D2`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**3 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`D4 97 6E B5 6B CF 11 85 20 58 2B 70 9F 73 E1 D6
 85 3E 00 1F DA F8 0E 1B 13 E0 D0 59 9D 5F B3 72`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**4 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`DA 67 C7 03 9E 98 BF 53 0C F7 A3 78 30 C6 66 4E
 14 CB AB 7F 54 0F 58 40 3B 1B 82 95 13 18 EE 5C`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**5 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`B9 7A 90 6F BF 83 EF 7C 81 25 17 AB F3 B2 D0 AE
 A0 C4 F6 03 18 CE 11 CF 10 39 25 12 7F 59 EE CD`

TurboSHAKE128(M=ptn(17**6 bytes), D=`1F`, 32):
`35 CD 49 4A DE DE D2 F2 52 39 AF 09 A7 B8 EF 0C
 4D 1C A4 FE 2D 1A C3 70 FA 63 21 6F E7 B4 C2 B1`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`01`, 32):
`BF 32 3F 94 04 94 E8 8E E1 C5 40 FE 66 0B E8 A0
 C9 3F 43 D1 5E C0 06 99 84 62 FA 99 4E ED 5D AB`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF`, D=`06`, 32):
`8E C9 C6 64 65 ED 0D 4A 6C 35 D1 35 06 71 8D 68
 7A 25 CB 05 C7 4C CA 1E 42 50 1A BD 83 87 4A 67`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`07`, 32):
`B6 58 57 60 01 CA D9 B1 E5 F3 99 A9 F7 77 23 BB
 A0 54 58 04 2D 68 20 6F 72 52 68 2D BA 36 63 ED`

TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF FF FF FF FF FF FF`, D=`0B`, 32):
`8D EE AA 1A EC 47 CC EE 56 9F 65 9C 21 DF A8 E1
 12 DB 3C EE 37 B1 81 78 B2 AC D8 05 B7 99 CC 37`
```

```
TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF`, D=`30`, 32):  
`55 31 22 E2 13 5E 36 3C 32 92 BE D2 C6 42 1F A2  
32 BA B0 3D AA 07 C7 D6 63 66 03 28 65 06 32 5B`
```

```
TurboSHAKE128(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`7F`, 32):  
`16 27 4C C6 56 D4 4C EF D4 22 39 5D 0F 90 53 BD  
A6 D2 8E 12 2A BA 15 C7 65 E5 AD 0E 6E AF 26 F9`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`00`^0, D=`1F`, 64):
`36 7A 32 9D AF EA 87 1C 78 02 EC 67 F9 05 AE 13
  C5 76 95 DC 2C 66 63 C6 10 35 F5 9A 18 F8 E7 DB
  11 ED C0 E1 2E 91 EA 60 EB 6B 32 DF 06 DD 7F 00
  2F BA FA BB 6E 13 EC 1C C2 0D 99 55 47 60 0D B0`

TurboSHAKE256(M=`00`^0, D=`1F`, 10032), last 32 bytes:
`AB EF A1 16 30 C6 61 26 92 49 74 26 85 EC 08 2F
  20 72 65 DC CF 2F 43 53 4E 9C 61 BA 0C 9D 1D 75`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**0 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`3E 17 12 F9 28 F8 EA F1 05 46 32 B2 AA 0A 24 6E
  D8 B0 C3 78 72 8F 60 BC 97 04 10 15 5C 28 82 0E
  90 CC 90 D8 A3 00 6A A2 37 2C 5C 5E A1 76 B0 68
  2B F2 2B AE 74 67 AC 94 F7 4D 43 D3 9B 04 82 E2`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**1 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`B3 BA B0 30 0E 6A 19 1F BE 61 37 93 98 35 92 35
  78 79 4E A5 48 43 F5 01 10 90 FA 2F 37 80 A9 E5
  CB 22 C5 9D 78 B4 0A 0F BF F9 E6 72 C0 FB E0 97
  0B D2 C8 45 09 1C 60 44 D6 87 05 4D A5 D8 E9 C7`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**2 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`66 B8 10 DB 8E 90 78 04 24 C0 84 73 72 FD C9 57
  10 88 2F DE 31 C6 DF 75 BE B9 D4 CD 93 05 CF CA
  E3 5E 7B 83 E8 B7 E6 EB 4B 78 60 58 80 11 63 16
  FE 2C 07 8A 09 B9 4A D7 B8 21 3C 0A 73 8B 65 C0`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**3 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`C7 4E BC 91 9A 5B 3B 0D D1 22 81 85 BA 02 D2 9E
  F4 42 D6 9D 3D 42 76 A9 3E FE 0B F9 A1 6A 7D C0
  CD 4E AB AD AB 8C D7 A5 ED D9 66 95 F5 D3 60 AB
  E0 9E 2C 65 11 A3 EC 39 7D A3 B7 6B 9E 16 74 FB`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**4 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`02 CC 3A 88 97 E6 F4 F6 CC B6 FD 46 63 1B 1F 52
  07 B6 6C 6D E9 C7 B5 5B 2D 1A 23 13 4A 17 0A FD
  AC 23 4E AB A9 A7 7C FF 88 C1 F0 20 B7 37 24 61
  8C 56 87 B3 62 C4 30 B2 48 CD 38 64 7F 84 8A 1D`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**5 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`AD D5 3B 06 54 3E 58 4B 58 23 F6 26 99 6A EE 50
  FE 45 ED 15 F2 02 43 A7 16 54 85 AC B4 AA 76 B4
  FF DA 75 CE DF 6D 8C DC 95 C3 32 BD 56 F4 B9 86
  B5 8B B1 7D 17 78 BF C1 B1 A9 75 45 CD F4 EC 9F`

TurboSHAKE256(M=ptn(17**6 bytes), D=`1F`, 64):
`9E 11 BC 59 C2 4E 73 99 3C 14 84 EC 66 35 8E F7
  1D B7 4A EF D8 4E 12 3F 78 00 BA 9C 48 53 E0 2C
  FE 70 1D 9E 6B B7 65 A3 04 F0 DC 34 A4 EE 3B A8
  2C 41 0F 0D A7 0E 86 BF BD 90 EA 87 7C 2D 61 04`

TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`01`, 64):
`D2 1C 6F BB F5 87 FA 22 82 F2 9A EA 62 01 75 FB
  02 57 41 3A F7 8A 0B 1B 2A 87 41 9C E0 31 D9 33
  AE 7A 4D 38 33 27 A8 A1 76 41 A3 4F 8A 1D 10 03
  AD 7D A6 B7 2D BA 84 BB 62 FE F2 8F 62 F1 24 24`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF`, D=`06`, 64):  
`73 8D 7B 4E 37 D1 8B 7F 22 AD 1B 53 13 E3 57 E3  
DD 7D 07 05 6A 26 A3 03 C4 33 FA 35 33 45 52 80  
F4 F5 A7 D4 F7 00 EF B4 37 FE 6D 28 14 05 E0 7B  
E3 2A 0A 97 2E 22 E6 3A DC 1B 09 0D AE FE 00 4B`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`07`, 64):  
`18 B3 B5 B7 06 1C 2E 67 C1 75 3A 00 E6 AD 7E D7  
BA 1C 90 6C F9 3E FB 70 92 EA F2 7F BE EB B7 55  
AE 6E 29 24 93 C1 10 E4 8D 26 00 28 49 2B 8E 09  
B5 50 06 12 B8 F2 57 89 85 DE D5 35 7D 00 EC 67`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF FF FF FF FF FF FF`, D=`0B`, 64):  
`BB 36 76 49 51 EC 97 E9 D8 5F 7E E9 A6 7A 77 18  
FC 00 5C F4 25 56 BE 79 CE 12 C0 BD E5 0E 57 36  
D6 63 2B 0D 0D FB 20 2D 1B BB 8F FE 3D D7 4C B0  
08 34 FA 75 6C B0 34 71 BA B1 3A 1E 2C 16 B3 C0`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF`, D=`30`, 64):  
`F3 FE 12 87 3D 34 BC BB 2E 60 87 79 D6 B7 0E 7F  
86 BE C7 E9 0B F1 13 CB D4 FD D0 C4 E2 F4 62 5E  
14 8D D7 EE 1A 52 77 6C F7 7F 24 05 14 D9 CC FC  
3B 5D DA B8 EE 25 5E 39 EE 38 90 72 96 2C 11 1A`
```

```
TurboSHAKE256(M=`FF FF FF`, D=`7F`, 64):  
`AB E5 69 C1 F7 7E C3 40 F0 27 05 E7 D3 7C 9A B7  
E1 55 51 6E 4A 6A 15 00 21 D7 0B 6F AC 0B B4 0C  
06 9F 9A 98 28 A0 D5 75 CD 99 F9 BA E4 35 AB 1A  
CF 7E D9 11 0B A9 7C E0 38 8D 07 4B AC 76 87 76`
```

```
KT128(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 32):
`1A C2 D4 50 FC 3B 42 05 D1 9D A7 BF CA 1B 37 51
 3C 08 03 57 7A C7 16 7F 06 FE 2C E1 F0 EF 39 E5`

KT128(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 64):
`1A C2 D4 50 FC 3B 42 05 D1 9D A7 BF CA 1B 37 51
 3C 08 03 57 7A C7 16 7F 06 FE 2C E1 F0 EF 39 E5
 42 69 C0 56 B8 C8 2E 48 27 60 38 B6 D2 92 96 6C
 C0 7A 3D 46 45 27 2E 31 FF 38 50 81 39 EB 0A 71`

KT128(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 10032), last 32 bytes:
`E8 DC 56 36 42 F7 22 8C 84 68 4C 89 84 05 D3 A8
 34 79 91 58 C0 79 B1 28 80 27 7A 1D 28 E2 FF 6D`

KT128(M=ptn(1 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`2B DA 92 45 0E 8B 14 7F 8A 7C B6 29 E7 84 A0 58
 EF CA 7C F7 D8 21 8E 02 D3 45 DF AA 65 24 4A 1F`

KT128(M=ptn(17 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`6B F7 5F A2 23 91 98 DB 47 72 E3 64 78 F8 E1 9B
 0F 37 12 05 F6 A9 A9 3A 27 3F 51 DF 37 12 28 88`

KT128(M=ptn(17**2 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`0C 31 5E BC DE DB F6 14 26 DE 7D CF 8F B7 25 D1
 E7 46 75 D7 F5 32 7A 50 67 F3 67 B1 08 EC B6 7C`

KT128(M=ptn(17**3 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`CB 55 2E 2E C7 7D 99 10 70 1D 57 8B 45 7D DF 77
 2C 12 E3 22 E4 EE 7F E4 17 F9 2C 75 8F 0D 59 D0`

KT128(M=ptn(17**4 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`87 01 04 5E 22 20 53 45 FF 4D DA 05 55 5C BB 5C
 3A F1 A7 71 C2 B8 9B AE F3 7D B4 3D 99 98 B9 FE`

KT128(M=ptn(17**5 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`84 4D 61 09 33 B1 B9 96 3C BD EB 5A E3 B6 B0 5C
 C7 CB D6 7C EE DF 88 3E B6 78 A0 A8 E0 37 16 82`

KT128(M=ptn(17**6 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`3C 39 07 82 A8 A4 E8 9F A6 36 7F 72 FE AA F1 32
 55 C8 D9 58 78 48 1D 3C D8 CE 85 F5 8E 88 0A F8`

KT128(`00`^0, C=ptn(1 bytes), 32):
`FA B6 58 DB 63 E9 4A 24 61 88 BF 7A F6 9A 13 30
 45 F4 6E E9 84 C5 6E 3C 33 28 CA AF 1A A1 A5 83`

KT128(`FF`, C=ptn(41 bytes), 32):
`D8 48 C5 06 8C ED 73 6F 44 62 15 9B 98 67 FD 4C
 20 B8 08 AC C3 D5 BC 48 E0 B0 6B A0 A3 76 2E C4`

KT128(`FF FF FF`, C=ptn(41**2 bytes), 32):
`C3 89 E5 00 9A E5 71 20 85 4C 2E 8C 64 67 0A C0
 13 58 CF 4C 1B AF 89 44 7A 72 42 34 DC 7C ED 74`

KT128(`FF FF FF FF FF FF FF`, C=ptn(41**3 bytes), 32):
`75 D2 F8 6A 2E 64 45 66 72 6B 4F BC FC 56 57 B9
 DB CF 07 0C 7B 0D CA 06 45 0A B2 91 D7 44 3B CF`
```



```
KT128(M=ptn(8191 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`1B 57 76 36 F7 23 64 3E 99 0C C7 D6 A6 59 83 74
 36 FD 6A 10 36 26 60 0E B8 30 1C D1 DB E5 53 D6`

KT128(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=`00`^0, 32):
`48 F2 56 F6 77 2F 9E DF B6 A8 B6 61 EC 92 DC 93
 B9 5E BD 05 A0 8A 17 B3 9A E3 49 08 70 C9 26 C3`

KT128(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=ptn(8189 bytes), 32):
`3E D1 2F 70 FB 05 DD B5 86 89 51 0A B3 E4 D2 3C
 6C 60 33 84 9A A0 1E 1D 8C 22 0A 29 7F ED CD 0B`

KT128(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=ptn(8190 bytes), 32):
`6A 7C 1B 6A 5C D0 D8 C9 CA 94 3A 4A 21 6C C6 46
 04 55 9A 2E A4 5F 78 57 0A 15 25 3D 67 BA 00 AE`
```

```
KT256(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 64):
`B2 3D 2E 9C EA 9F 49 04 E0 2B EC 06 81 7F C1 0C
E3 8C E8 E9 3E F4 C8 9E 65 37 07 6A F8 64 64 04
E3 E8 B6 81 07 B8 83 3A 5D 30 49 0A A3 34 82 35
3F D4 AD C7 14 8E CB 78 28 55 00 3A AE BD E4 A9`

KT256(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 128):
`B2 3D 2E 9C EA 9F 49 04 E0 2B EC 06 81 7F C1 0C
E3 8C E8 E9 3E F4 C8 9E 65 37 07 6A F8 64 64 04
E3 E8 B6 81 07 B8 83 3A 5D 30 49 0A A3 34 82 35
3F D4 AD C7 14 8E CB 78 28 55 00 3A AE BD E4 A9
B0 92 53 19 D8 EA 1E 12 1A 60 98 21 EC 19 EF EA
89 E6 D0 8D AE E1 66 2B 69 C8 40 28 9F 18 8B A8
60 F5 57 60 B6 1F 82 11 4C 03 0C 97 E5 17 84 49
60 8C CD 2C D2 D9 19 FC 78 29 FF 69 93 1A C4 D0`

KT256(M=`00`^0, C=`00`^0, 10064), last 64 bytes:
`AD 4A 1D 71 8C F9 50 50 67 09 A4 C3 33 96 13 9B
44 49 04 1F C7 9A 05 D6 8D A3 5F 1E 45 35 22 E0
56 C6 4F E9 49 58 E7 08 5F 29 64 88 82 59 B9 93
27 52 F3 CC D8 55 28 8E FE E5 FC BB 8B 56 30 69`

KT256(M=ptn(1 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`0D 00 5A 19 40 85 36 02 17 12 8C F1 7F 91 E1 F7
13 14 EF A5 56 45 39 D4 44 91 2E 34 37 EF A1 7F
82 DB 6F 6F FE 76 E7 81 EA A0 68 BC E0 1F 2B BF
81 EA CB 98 3D 72 30 F2 FB 02 83 4A 21 B1 DD D0`

KT256(M=ptn(17 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`1B A3 C0 2B 1F C5 14 47 4F 06 C8 97 99 78 A9 05
6C 84 83 F4 A1 B6 3D 0D CC EF E3 A2 8A 2F 32 3E
1C DC CA 40 EB F0 06 AC 76 EF 03 97 15 23 46 83
7B 12 77 D3 E7 FA A9 C9 65 3B 19 07 50 98 52 7B`

KT256(M=ptn(17**2 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`DE 8C CB C6 3E 0F 13 3E BB 44 16 81 4D 4C 66 F6
91 BB F8 B6 A6 1E C0 A7 70 0F 83 6B 08 6C B0 29
D5 4F 12 AC 71 59 47 2C 72 DB 11 8C 35 B4 E6 AA
21 3C 65 62 CA AA 9D CC 51 89 59 E6 9B 10 F3 BA`

KT256(M=ptn(17**3 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`64 7E FB 49 FE 9D 71 75 00 17 1B 41 E7 F1 1B D4
91 54 44 43 20 99 97 CE 1C 25 30 D1 5E B1 FF BB
59 89 35 EF 95 45 28 FF C1 52 B1 E4 D7 31 EE 26
83 68 06 74 36 5C D1 91 D5 62 BA E7 53 B8 4A A5`

KT256(M=ptn(17**4 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`B0 62 75 D2 84 CD 1C F2 05 BC BE 57 DC CD 3E C1
FF 66 86 E3 ED 15 77 63 83 E1 F2 FA 3C 6A C8 F0
8B F8 A1 62 82 9D B1 A4 4B 2A 43 FF 83 DD 89 C3
CF 1C EB 61 ED E6 59 76 6D 5C CF 81 7A 62 BA 8D`

KT256(M=ptn(17**5 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`94 73 83 1D 76 A4 C7 BF 77 AC E4 5B 59 F1 45 8B
16 73 D6 4B CD 87 7A 7C 66 B2 66 4A A6 DD 14 9E
60 EA B7 1B 5C 2B AB 85 8C 07 4D ED 81 DD CE 2B
40 22 B5 21 59 35 C0 D4 D1 9B F5 11 AE EB 07 72`
```

```
KT256(M=ptn(17**6 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`06 52 B7 40 D7 8C 5E 1F 7C 8D CC 17 77 09 73 82
 76 8B 7F F3 8F 9A 7A 20 F2 9F 41 3B B1 B3 04 5B
 31 A5 57 8F 56 8F 91 1E 09 CF 44 74 6D A8 42 24
 A5 26 6E 96 A4 A5 35 E8 71 32 4E 4F 9C 70 04 DA`
```

```
KT256(`00`^0, C=ptn(1 bytes), 64):
`92 80 F5 CC 39 B5 4A 5A 59 4E C6 3D E0 BB 99 37
 1E 46 09 D4 4B F8 45 C2 F5 B8 C3 16 D7 2B 15 98
 11 F7 48 F2 3E 3F AB BE 5C 32 26 EC 96 C6 21 86
 DF 2D 33 E9 DF 74 C5 06 9C EE CB B4 DD 10 EF F6`
```

```
KT256(`FF`, C=ptn(41 bytes), 64):
`47 EF 96 DD 61 6F 20 09 37 AA 78 47 E3 4E C2 FE
 AE 80 87 E3 76 1D C0 F8 C1 A1 54 F5 1D C9 CC F8
 45 D7 AD BC E5 7F F6 4B 63 97 22 C6 A1 67 2E 3B
 F5 37 2D 87 E0 0A FF 89 BE 97 24 07 56 99 88 53`
```

```
KT256(`FF FF FF`, C=ptn(41**2 bytes), 64):
`3B 48 66 7A 50 51 C5 96 6C 53 C5 D4 2B 95 DE 45
 1E 05 58 4E 78 06 E2 FB 76 5E DA 95 90 74 17 2C
 B4 38 A9 E9 1D DE 33 7C 98 E9 C4 1B ED 94 C4 E0
 AE F4 31 D0 B6 4E F2 32 4F 79 32 CA A6 F5 49 69`
```

```
KT256(`FF FF FF FF FF FF FF`, C=ptn(41**3 bytes), 64):
`E0 91 1C C0 00 25 E1 54 08 31 E2 66 D9 4A DD 9B
 98 71 21 42 B8 0D 26 29 E6 43 AA C4 EF AF 5A 3A
 30 A8 8C BF 4A C2 A9 1A 24 32 74 30 54 FB CC 98
 97 67 0E 86 BA 8C EC 2F C2 AC E9 C9 66 36 97 24`
```

```
KT256(M=ptn(8191 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`30 81 43 4D 93 A4 10 8D 8D 8A 33 05 B8 96 82 CE
 BE DC 7C A4 EA 8A 3C E8 69 FB B7 3C BE 4A 58 EE
 F6 F2 4D E3 8F FC 17 05 14 C7 0E 7A B2 D0 1F 03
 81 26 16 E8 63 D7 69 AF B3 75 31 93 BA 04 5B 20`
```

```
KT256(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=`00`^0, 64):
`C6 EE 8E 2A D3 20 0C 01 8A C8 7A AA 03 1C DA C2
 21 21 B4 12 D0 7D C6 E0 DC CB B5 34 23 74 7E 9A
 1C 18 83 4D 99 DF 59 6C F0 CF 4B 8D FA FB 7B F0
 2D 13 9D 0C 90 35 72 5A DC 1A 01 B7 23 0A 41 FA`
```

```
KT256(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=ptn(8189 bytes), 64):
`74 E4 78 79 F1 0A 9C 5D 11 BD 2D A7 E1 94 FE 57
 E8 63 78 BF 3C 3F 74 48 EF F3 C5 76 A0 F1 8C 5C
 AA E0 99 99 79 51 20 90 A7 F3 48 AF 42 60 D4 DE
 3C 37 F1 EC AF 8D 2C 2C 96 C1 D1 6C 64 B1 24 96`
```

```
KT256(M=ptn(8192 bytes), C=ptn(8190 bytes), 64):
`F4 B5 90 8B 92 9F FE 01 E0 F7 9E C2 F2 12 43 D4
 1A 39 6B 2E 73 03 A6 AF 1D 63 99 CD 6C 7A 0A 2D
 D7 C4 F6 07 E8 27 7F 9C 9B 1C B4 AB 9D DC 59 D4
 B9 2D 1F C7 55 84 41 F1 83 2C 32 79 A4 24 1B 8B`
```

## 6. IANA Considerations

In the "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry", k12-256 refers to the hash function obtained by evaluating KT128 on the input message with default C (the empty string) and L = 32 bytes (256 bits). Similarly, k12-512 refers to the hash function obtained by evaluating KT256 on the input message with default C (the empty string) and L = 64 bytes (512 bits).

In the "COSE Algorithms" registry, IANA has added the following entries for TurboSHAKE and KangarooTwelve:

Name	Value	Description	Capabilities
TurboSHAKE128	-261	TurboSHAKE128 XOF	[kty]
TurboSHAKE256	-262	TurboSHAKE256 XOF	[kty]
KT128	-263	KT128 XOF	[kty]
KT256	-264	KT256 XOF	[kty]

Table 3

## 7. Security Considerations

This document is meant to serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide for the KangarooTwelve and TurboSHAKE eXtendable-Output Functions. The security assurance of these functions relies on the cryptanalysis of reduced-round versions of Keccak, and they have the same claimed security strength as their corresponding SHAKE functions.

	Security Claim
<b>TurboSHAKE128</b>	128 bits (same as SHAKE128)
<b>KT128</b>	128 bits (same as SHAKE128)
<b>TurboSHAKE256</b>	256 bits (same as SHAKE256)
<b>KT256</b>	256 bits (same as SHAKE256)

Table 4

To be more precise, KT128 is made of two layers:

- The inner function TurboSHAKE128. The security assurance of this layer relies on cryptanalysis. The TurboSHAKE128 function is exactly Keccak[r=1344, c=256] (as in SHAKE128) reduced to 12 rounds. Any cryptanalysis of reduced-round Keccak is also cryptanalysis of reduced-round TurboSHAKE128 (provided the number of rounds attacked is not higher than 12).
- The tree hashing over TurboSHAKE128. This layer is a mode on top of TurboSHAKE128 that does not introduce any vulnerability thanks to the use of Sakura coding proven secure in [SAKURA].

This reasoning is detailed and formalized in [KT].

KT256 is structured as KT128, except that it uses TurboSHAKE256 as the inner function. The TurboSHAKE256 function is exactly Keccak[r=1088, c=512] (as in SHAKE256) reduced to 12 rounds, and the same reasoning on cryptanalysis applies.

TurboSHAKE128 and KT128 aim at 128-bit security. To achieve 128-bit security strength,  $L$ , the chosen output length, **MUST** be large enough so that there are no generic attacks that violate 128-bit security. So for 128-bit (second) preimage security, the output should be at least 128 bits; for 128 bits of security against multi-target preimage attacks with  $T$  targets, the output should be at least  $128 + \log_2(T)$  bits; and for 128-bit collision security, the output should be at least 256 bits. Furthermore, when the output length is at least 256 bits, TurboSHAKE128 and KT128 achieve NIST's post-quantum security level 2 [NISTPQ].

Similarly, TurboSHAKE256 and KT256 aim at 256-bit security. To achieve 256-bit security strength,  $L$ , the chosen output length, **MUST** be large enough so that there are no generic attacks that violate 256-bit security. So for 256-bit (second) preimage security, the output should be at least 256 bits; for 256 bits of security against multi-target preimage attacks with  $T$  targets, the output should be at least  $256 + \log_2(T)$  bits; and for 256-bit collision security, the output should be at least 512 bits. Furthermore, when the output length is at least 512 bits, TurboSHAKE256 and KT256 achieve NIST's post-quantum security level 5 [NISTPQ].

Unlike the SHA-256 and SHA-512 functions, TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, KT128, and KT256 do not suffer from the length extension weakness and therefore do not require the use of the HMAC construction, for instance, when used for MAC computation [FIPS198]. Also, they can naturally be used as a key derivation function. The input must be an injective encoding of secret and diversification material, and the output can be taken as the derived key(s). The input does not need to be uniformly distributed, e.g., it can be a shared secret produced by the Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, but it needs to have sufficient min-entropy.

Lastly, as KT128 and KT256 use TurboSHAKE with three values for  $D$ , namely 0x06, 0x07, and 0x0B, protocols that use both KT128 and TurboSHAKE128 or both KT256 and TurboSHAKE256 **SHOULD** avoid using these three values for  $D$ .

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

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### 8.2. Informative References

- [FIPS180] NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST FIPS 180-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015, <<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>>.
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- [KECCAK\_CRYPTANALYSIS] Keccak Team, "Summary of Third-party cryptanalysis of Keccak", <[https://www.keccak.team/third\\_party.html](https://www.keccak.team/third_party.html)>.
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- [NISTPQ] NIST, "Submission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process", <<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/documents/call-for-proposals-final-dec-2016.pdf>>.

**[SAKURA]** Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., and G. Van Assche, "Sakura: a Flexible Coding for Tree Hashing", Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2014), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8479, pp. 217-234, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-07536-5\_14, 2014, <[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-07536-5\\_14](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-07536-5_14)>.

**[TURBOSHAKE]** Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Hoffert, S., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., Van Keer, R., and B. Viguier, "TurboSHAKE", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/342, March 2023, <<http://eprint.iacr.org/2023/342>>.

**[XKCP]** "eXtended Keccak Code Package", commit 64404bee, December 2022, <<https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP>>.

## Appendix A. Pseudocode

The subsections of this appendix contain pseudocode definitions of TurboSHAKE128, TurboSHAKE256, and KangarooTwelve. Standalone Python versions are also available in the Keccak Code Package [XKCP] and in [KT]

### A.1. Keccak-p[1600,n\_r=12]

```
KP(state):
  RC[0] = `8B 80 00 80 00 00 00 00`
  RC[1] = `8B 00 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[2] = `89 80 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[3] = `03 80 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[4] = `02 80 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[5] = `80 00 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[6] = `0A 80 00 00 00 00 00 00`
  RC[7] = `0A 00 00 80 00 00 00 80`
  RC[8] = `81 80 00 80 00 00 00 80`
  RC[9] = `80 80 00 00 00 00 00 80`
  RC[10] = `01 00 00 80 00 00 00 00`
  RC[11] = `08 80 00 80 00 00 00 80`

  for x from 0 to 4
    for y from 0 to 4
      lanes[x][y] = state[8*(x+5*y):8*(x+5*y)+8]

  for round from 0 to 11
    # theta
    for x from 0 to 4
      C[x] = lanes[x][0]
      C[x] ^= lanes[x][1]
      C[x] ^= lanes[x][2]
      C[x] ^= lanes[x][3]
      C[x] ^= lanes[x][4]
    for x from 0 to 4
      D[x] = C[(x+4) mod 5] ^ ROL64(C[(x+1) mod 5], 1)
    for y from 0 to 4
      for x from 0 to 4
        lanes[x][y] = lanes[x][y]^D[x]
```

```
# rho and pi
(x, y) = (1, 0)
current = lanes[x][y]
for t from 0 to 23
  (x, y) = (y, (2*x+3*y) mod 5)
  (current, lanes[x][y]) =
    (lanes[x][y], ROL64(current, (t+1)*(t+2)/2))

# chi
for y from 0 to 4
  for x from 0 to 4
    T[x] = lanes[x][y]
  for x from 0 to 4
    lanes[x][y] = T[x] ^((not T[(x+1) mod 5]) & T[(x+2) mod 5])

# iota
lanes[0][0] ^= RC[round]

state = `00`^0
for y from 0 to 4
  for x from 0 to 4
    state = state || lanes[x][y]

return state
end
```

where  $\text{ROL64}(x, y)$  is a rotation of the 'x' 64-bit word toward the bits with higher indexes by 'y' positions. The 8-bytes byte string x is interpreted as a 64-bit word in little-endian format.



## A.2. TurboSHAKE128

```
TurboSHAKE128(message, separationByte, outputByteLen):
  offset = 0
  state = `00`^200
  input = message || separationByte

  # === Absorb complete blocks ===
  while offset < |input| - 168
    state ^= input[offset : offset + 168] || `00`^32
    state = KP(state)
    offset += 168

  # === Absorb last block and treatment of padding ===
  LastBlockLength = |input| - offset
  state ^= input[offset:] || `00`^(200-LastBlockLength)
  state ^= `00`^167 || `80` || `00`^32
  state = KP(state)

  # === Squeeze ===
  output = `00`^0
  while outputByteLen > 168
    output = output || state[0:168]
    outputByteLen -= 168
    state = KP(state)

  output = output || state[0:outputByteLen]

  return output
```

### A.3. TurboSHAKE256

```
TurboSHAKE256(message, separationByte, outputByteLen):
  offset = 0
  state = `00`^200
  input = message || separationByte

  # === Absorb complete blocks ===
  while offset < |input| - 136
    state ^= input[offset : offset + 136] || `00`^64
    state = KP(state)
    offset += 136

  # === Absorb last block and treatment of padding ===
  LastBlockLength = |input| - offset
  state ^= input[offset:] || `00`^(200-LastBlockLength)
  state ^= `00`^135 || `80` || `00`^64
  state = KP(state)

  # === Squeeze ===
  output = `00`^0
  while outputByteLen > 136
    output = output || state[0:136]
    outputByteLen -= 136
    state = KP(state)

  output = output || state[0:outputByteLen]

  return output
```

## A.4. KT128

```

KT128(inputMessage, customString, outputByteLen):
  S = inputMessage || customString
  S = S || length_encode( |customString| )

  if |S| <= 8192
    return TurboSHAKE128(S, `07`, outputByteLen)
  else
    # === Kangaroo hopping ===
    FinalNode = S[0:8192] || `03` || `00`^7
    offset = 8192
    numBlock = 0
    while offset < |S|
      blockSize = min( |S| - offset, 8192)
      CV = TurboSHAKE128(S[offset : offset+blockSize], `0B`, 32)
      FinalNode = FinalNode || CV
      numBlock += 1
      offset += blockSize

    FinalNode = FinalNode || length_encode( numBlock ) || `FF FF`

    return TurboSHAKE128(FinalNode, `06`, outputByteLen)
  end

```

## A.5. KT256

```

KT256(inputMessage, customString, outputByteLen):
  S = inputMessage || customString
  S = S || length_encode( |customString| )

  if |S| <= 8192
    return TurboSHAKE256(S, `07`, outputByteLen)
  else
    # === Kangaroo hopping ===
    FinalNode = S[0:8192] || `03` || `00`^7
    offset = 8192
    numBlock = 0
    while offset < |S|
      blockSize = min( |S| - offset, 8192)
      CV = TurboSHAKE256(S[offset : offset+blockSize], `0B`, 64)
      FinalNode = FinalNode || CV
      numBlock += 1
      offset += blockSize

    FinalNode = FinalNode || length_encode( numBlock ) || `FF FF`

    return TurboSHAKE256(FinalNode, `06`, outputByteLen)
  end

```

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